Untitled Document
Part One
Within six weeks of Australian troops landing in East Timor on May 24, the
country’s prime minister Mari Alkatiri was forced to resign and the former
foreign minister, Jose Ramos-Horta, who has made no secret of his sympathies
for the US and Australia, had been installed in his place.
If one were to believe the Australian media, Canberra had no hand in these
events. Acting out of the purest of motives, Prime Minister John Howard dispatched
military forces at the end of May to protect the East Timorese from a sudden
and largely inexplicable eruption of ethnic violence between “easterners”
and “westerners”. Since then, the story goes, Australia has remained
a neutral arbiter, standing above the political conflict in Dili. It is simply
fortuitous that the new prime minister, is, as the Sydney Morning Herald put
it, the “right man” for East Timor.
In reality, what has taken place is an Australian-inspired political coup.
As troops were landing, Howard’s public declaration that East Timor had
not been well-governed gave the signal for a deluge of propaganda in the Australian
media demonising Alkatiri as aloof, an autocrat and a Marxist. Insistent demands
that he take full responsibility for the violence and resign were counterposed
to high praise for Ramos-Horta and President Xanana Gusmao, both of whom backed
the Australian-sponsored campaign to remove the prime minister.
Alkatiri refused to immediately cave in and Gusmao lacked the constitutional
power to sack him without the support of parliament, where Alkatiri’s
Fretilin party had a large majority. So a new approach was taken. The government-owned
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) aired a “Four Corners”
program on June 19, which dredged up lurid allegations from Alkatiri’s
political enemies that the prime minister had approved the formation of a “hit
squad” to murder his opponents. Quite apart from the dubious and unsupported
character of the claims, the program conveniently ignored the fact that the
rebel soldiers and police officers who were making the charges were clearly
guilty of taking up arms against the state.
Gusmao and Horta were “sympathetic” to rebel leaders such as “Major”
Alfredo Reinado, a dubious character who had trained in 2005 at the Australian
defence academy in Canberra and who had become a favourite of the Australian
press. Reinado had pledged his allegiance to Gusmao and welcomed the arrival
of Australian troops. He was also openly threatening civil war if Alkatiri were
not sacked. No-one in Dili, Canberra or the Australian media even broached the
suggestion that Reinado and his fellow rebels should be charged with treason.
Instead Gusmao sent a tape of the ABC program, with its unsubstantiated allegations,
to Alkatiri, with a letter demanding his immediate resignation.
Just a week later, on June 26, Alkatiri resigned. But since Fretilin remained
the largest party in parliament, with the constitutional right to nominate a
new prime minister, the issue of who was to replace him remained. To force Fretilin
into submission, Gusmao threatened to ignore the constitution, dismiss parliament
and select his own interim government, pending fresh elections. Once again Fretilin
capitulated. Ramos-Horta, who, like Gusmao had not been a Fretilin member for
many years, was included among its three nominees. On July 10, he was duly sworn
in.
While the Howard government has been rather coy about acknowledging its role,
Murdoch’s Australian newspaper has been less so. In a comment on June
3, foreign editor Greg Sheridan bluntly declared: “Certainly if Alkatiri
remains Prime Minister of East Timor, this is a shocking indictment of Australian
impotence. If you cannot translate the leverage of 1,300 troops, 50 police,
hundreds of support personnel, buckets of aid and a critical international rescue
mission into enough influence to get rid of a disastrous Marxist Prime Minister,
then you are just not very skilled in the arts of influence, tutelage, sponsorship
and, ultimately, promoting the national interest.”
In his own crude fashion, Sheridan was simply foreshadowing what subsequently
took place. Canberra shamelessly exploited and manipulated the factional divisions
within the East Timorese political elite to install the man it wanted. Ramos-Horta’s
first actions were to insist that Australia should lead any new UN mission to
East Timor and, most importantly, to pledge that the parliament would rapidly
ratify a stalled agreement between East Timor and Australia over the division
of proceeds from the Greater Sunrise gas field. Among other concerns, the Australian
government’s hostility to Alkatiri stemmed from his refusal to cave in
totally to Canberra’s plans for the estimated $30 billion worth of oil
and gas reserves under the Timor Sea.
Inter-imperialist rivalries
The events of the past weeks have flowed organically from Australia’s
past relationship with East Timor, in which concern for the welfare of the East
Timorese people has never been a factor. Howard, like his Labor and Liberal
predecessors, backed the Indonesian Suharto dictatorship’s invasion of
East Timor in 1975 and its subsequent annexation of the former Portuguese colony.
Canberra’s interest was centred on control of the substantial Timor Sea
oil and gas reserves, which it secured in 1989 under the Timor Gap Treaty.
After the fall of Suharto in 1998, Australia faced the prospect of the treaty
being declared null and void. The former colonial ruler, Portugal, in league
with East Timor’s leaders, was pushing for the country’s independence,
as a means of regaining influence. Since the UN had never formally recognised
Indonesia’s annexation, a separate state of East Timor might well abrogate
Canberra’s deal with Jakarta, particularly as it ran counter to international
law. The Australian ruling elite made the necessary calculations and effected
an abrupt about-face. Suddenly, it became an advocate for the rights of the
East Timorese people and a supporter of “independence”. Utilising
the violence carried out by pro-Indonesian militia both before and after the
UN-supervised independence referendum in 1999 as the pretext, the Howard government
dispatched troops to East Timor. Its real aim was to preempt Australia’s
rival, Portugal.
The perspective of “independence” for East Timor was never viable.
In the era of globalised production, any nation, no matter how large, is subject
to the dictates of the major transnational corporations and internationally
mobile capital. A tiny statelet on an impoverished half-island, with a population
of less than a million, could never be “independent” of the regional
and global powers, or of the various international financial institutions, such
as the World Bank and IMF. The inter-imperialist rivalry for East Timor’s
lucrative resources only intensified after the country was transformed into
a UN protectorate. Its “Special Representative of the Secretary General,”
the late Sergio Viera de Mello, had all the powers of a colonial governor.
At stake was not only the Timor Sea oil and gas, but the island’s strategic
location astride key naval and shipping routes between the Indian and Pacific
oceans. Washington’s support for Canberra’s ambitions in East Timor
was bound up with the growing rivalry between the US and China for influence
in Asia. The Pentagon has long regarded the deep-water Ombei Wetar Straits as
one of the crucial naval “choke points” in any military conflict
in the Asia Pacific region. Likewise Portugal, backed by the European Union,
viewed East Timor as an important outpost in the struggle for influence in Asia,
a region that has assumed critical importance with China’s and India’s
emergence as the world’s main cheap labour platforms.
The inter-imperialist rivalries found their expression in Dili’s factional
politics. The Fretilin leadership had always looked to Portugal. Fretilin itself
was forged, not in a struggle against Portuguese colonial rule, but rather against
the Indonesian annexation of East Timor and its repressive military rule. The
party’s leaders were drawn from the Portuguese-educated elite, and they
used East Timor’s so-called “Portuguese identity” in their
campaign for “independence” from Indonesia. Fretilin’s program
was not Marxist, but it did advance basic democratic and social reforms that
rested on a nationally-regulated capitalist economy.
Opponents of Fretilin’s agenda included Horta and Gusmao, who broke with
the party and regarded its limited reformist program as too radical. Gusmao
oriented directly to the most rightwing and reactionary political forces in
East Timor, including the Catholic Church and the UDT, which had supported the
country’s incorporation into Indonesia. UDT leader Mario Carrascalao,
the island’s largest coffee plantation owner, served as provincial governor
for a decade under the Indonesian dictatorship. These layers regarded the “Marxist”
Fretilin as an intolerable barrier to foreign capital and to their ambitions
for the unfettered exploitation of the island’s resources and cheap labour.
Immediately prior to Suharto’s fall in 1998, Gusmao, with the support
of Portugal, engineered a grand coalition of “national unity”—the
National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT)—which included Fretilin
as well as the UDT, church leaders and individuals such as Horta. Fretilin,
however, remained the dominant force within the CNRT, because it was popularly
recognised as having led the difficult and courageous struggle against the brutal
24-year Indonesian occupation.
Having achieved its objective of a UN referendum, the CNRT began to fracture
under UN rule. Despite Gusmao’s efforts to maintain the broad coalition
on which his influence rested, Fretilin increasingly came to play the dominant
political role.
This outcome produced seething resentment in Australian ruling circles. Even
though it had provided the majority of troops for the UN military intervention
in 1999, Canberra found that rival Portugal was gaining the political upper
hand through its ties to Fretilin. In the political manouevring that took place
in the lead-up to formal independence in May 2002, the Howard government increasingly
relied on Fretilin’s opponents. Both Gusmao and Ramos-Horta had longstanding
connections with Australia—Horta during his exile and Gusmao through his
Australian wife, Kirsty Sword.
Gusmao made a conscious appeal to the various anti-Fretilin layers on the basis
of “national unity”. Around him gathered those whose positions were
threatened by Fretilin’s ascendency—former officials and police
in the Indonesian provincial administration, businessmen wanting immediate access
to be provided to foreign investors, and the Catholic church, which opposed
Fretilin’s secular demands for a separation of church and state. Insofar
as any geographic divide existed, it reflected the fact that Fretilin’s
base had traditionally been in the eastern areas of the island—those more
conducive to guerrilla warfare—rather than the more developed western
regions, with their links to the Indonesian province of West Timor. Gusmao,
who had established close ties with the Indonesian regime during his imprisonment
in Jakarta, called for reconciliation with Indonesia.
The political differences erupted into the open in the election for a constituent
assembly in August 2001. Fretilin won an absolute majority—55 of the 88
seats. Its closest rival, with seven seats, was the Democratic Party (PD), formed
just prior to the election. The PD appealed to younger, disaffected people who
saw few opportunities for advancement in a Fretilin-led state, where Portuguese,
spoken by few East Timorese, would be the official language. Mario Carrascalao’s
Social Democratic Party (PSD) gained just six seats.
Fretilin proposed a secular parliamentary constitution, which would ensure
the party’s continued dominance. Its opponents backed Gusmao’s push
for a presidential system, based on a “national unity” front, in
which he would hold overall power. Fretilin prevailed and, with UN backing,
transformed the constituent assembly into the first parliament. The factional
bitterness re-emerged during elections for the presidency in April 2002. Fretilin
did not stand a candidate, allowing Gusmao to win an overwhelming majority.
But Alkatiri pointedly announced that he would be casting a blank ballot, while
other Fretilin leaders gave tacit support to Gusmao’s nominal opponent.
As far as Canberra was concerned, the outcome of the UN-supervised process
was disastrous. Those in Dili most sympathetic to Australian interests had been
largely sidelined. While Gusmao had become president, he had limited constitutional
powers. Moreover, the Fretilin government quickly made clear it would not simply
acquiesce to Canberra’s diktats. In the week prior to formal independence,
the Howard government flew Alkatiri to Canberra by VIP jet to pressure him into
finalising a deal ceding most of the largest Timor Sea gas field—Greater
Sunrise—to Australia. But Alkitiri refused to cooperate.
Australian journalist Maryann Keady, in a recent article entitled “Imperialist
Coup in East Timor”, points out that the moves against the new government
began as soon as “independence” was declared. “The campaign
to oust Alkatiri began at least four years ago,” she wrote. “I recorded
the date after an American official started leaking stories of Alkatiri’s
corruption while I was freelancing for ABC Radio. I investigated the claims—and
came up with nought—but was more concerned with the tenor of criticism
by American and Australian officials that clearly suggested that they were wanting
to get rid of this ‘troublesome’ prime minister.... After interviewing
the major political leaders, it was clear that many would stop at nothing to
get rid of Timor’s first prime minister.”
Part Two
In the aftermath of “independence” in May 2002, political tensions
continued to escalate between Prime Minister Alkatiri and his Fretilin-majority
government on the one hand, and the anti-Fretilin forces led by President Gusmao
and Foreign Minister Horta on the other. They were soon to explode in scenes
that bore a remarkable similarity to the ones that erupted this year.
In an extraordinary speech on November 28, 2002, Gusmao seized on clashes between
police and supporters of a shadowy organisation known as CPD-RDTL in the town
of Baucau to issue a vitriolic attack on the government, including a demand
for the resignation of Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato. He also renewed his
call for a government of national unity and, echoing the rhetoric of the various
opposition parties, declaimed: “The party of government has been placing
itself above national interests and the interests of the people and its intention
to seize power in all its forms is clear.” Alkatiri emphatically rejected
Gusmao’s demands, declaring “our government was formed for five
years, not six months.”
Just days later, on December 3-4, rioting erupted in Dili. While it originated
in a student protest against heavy-handed police methods, the initial demonstration
was quickly subsumed into riots by gangs of unemployed youth, egged on by anti-Fretilin
opposition groups. In the subsequent investigations, witnesses testified to
seeing agitators directing the mob towards prominent symbols of the government.
Alkatiri’s house, and those of two of his relatives, were burnt to the
ground and the Dili mosque (Alkatiri has a Muslim background) was also attacked.
Two people were killed and more than 20 injured in clashes with police before
a curfew was imposed.
There is no doubt that the country’s deepening economic and social crisis
helped spark the riots. But Fretilin’s opponents also played a role. Lobato
accused the CPD-RDTL of “an orchestrated manoeuvre to topple the government.”
CPD-RDTL, which included disgruntled guerrilla fighters in its ranks, claimed
to be the genuine Fretilin. But it was also associated with figures who had
connections to the pro-Indonesian militia, which had ransacked the country in
1999.
Significantly, Mario Carrascalao, a major coffee plantation landowner, who
had served as governor under the Indonesian junta and headed the Partido Social
Democrata (PSD), a UDT breakaway, issued a warning of civil war: “We were
united against the Indonesians, now we are divided. That is the responsibility
of those who are in power and the dangers are great if we don’t recognise
where this could be leading,” he said.
The investigations failed to uncover who was responsible for the rioting. There
was no question, however, that Carrascalao’s PSD and Democratic Party,
the Catholic Church, disenchanted Falantil fighters and Dili youth gangs were
all deeply opposed to the government. Neither Fretilin nor its opponents had
any solution to the deep social crisis plaguing the country—the legacy
of economic backwardness produced by centuries of Portuguese and Indonesian
rule. But the opposition parties were able to appeal to the growing sense among
ordinary people that “independence” had failed to bring jobs, education
and an improvement in living standards. In fact, following the departure of
many well-paid UN officials in the wake of the declaration of independence,
Dili’s artificially inflated economy nose-dived.
The 2002 riots also raised questions about the role played by Australian troops
and police, who were criticised for their failure to act. In another recent
article entitled “East Timor: A New Cold War,” journalist Keady
observed: “Just after the 2002 unrest, I interviewed local witnesses as
well as the head of the UN and Australian forces about complaints that they
did nothing to stop the chaos. After much investigation, I was told that a UN
representative ‘unofficially’ went to the office to ask Prime Minister
Alkatiri to resign, an interesting response to civil disturbance and one that
makes a mockery of the UN pretence of apolitical humanitarian efforts.”
There was no doubt where the Howard government’s sympathies lay. In December
2002, East Timorese officials complained to the media that Australian Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer had been “abusive and aggressive” in negotiations
with Alkatiri over Timor Sea oil and gas. Downer voiced particular objections
to advice obtained by the Dili government from UN adviser Peter Galbraith to
the effect that it had a strong legal case for a far larger share of the energy
resources.
On December 9, 2002, in words that directly foreshadowed the recent denunciations
of Alkatiri, the Australian Financial Review published an article entitled “Gusmao
must take control” declaring: “There is widespread disillusion at
the performance of Alkatiri and his clique of old Fretilin leftists, who have
learned nothing and forgotten nothing since their days in Mozambique’s
failed socialist state more than 30 years ago.” The article concluded
that, on the contrary, the president [Gusmao] was “a national hero, a
modest and decent man” who “should be more than a national figurehead
in these critical circumstances”.
Australia’s involvement in Dili’s power struggle was transparent.
In May 2003, an article in the Australian-based Bulletin magazine commented:
“Fascinating too, is the diplomatic struggle between Lisbon and Canberra
for influence in East Timor. Neither side say they are in a battle, but it’s
clear each have their own agendas. In shades of the former Soviet Union, Portuguese
government radio blares out from speakers across the main square as the families
of old colonial government officials count their $US300 monthly pensions sent
from Lisbon. Where Australia’s fortress-like embassy is halfway to the
airport for an easier getaway if things turn ugly again, Portugal’s is
next door to the government offices, where Alkatiri and his clique are said
to lead the anti-Australian lobby.”
While the European Union backed Portugal’s bid for supremacy, Canberra
relied on Washington, which was also actively involved in Dili politics. In
an article entitled “Taming the ‘Banana Republic: The United States
in East Timor”, Ben Moxham, a research associate with Focus on the Global
South, a research and advocacy organization based in Bangkok, Thailand, pointed
out that the US-based organizations, the National Endowment for Democracy, the
International Republic Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute
were engaged in “democracy promotion” programs in East Timor. These
organisations were all directly involved in fomenting the pro-US “colour
revolutions” in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. “The [Republican
Party-aligned] IRI, in particular, has been training the country’s fledgling
political parties in the tricks of the trade. Through circumstances both deliberate
and coincidental, they have ended up helping only the Washington-friendly opposition.
While IRI sees itself as ‘life support’ for the country’s
opposition, the ruling party, Fretilin, sees it as interfering,” Moxham
wrote.
In 2003, tensions over international meddling erupted when the government proposed
an immigration bill that barred foreign citizens from engaging in political
activities. The legislation was bitterly criticised by opposition parties and
various Non-Government Organisations. It became the subject of a legal battle
and was eventually vetoed by President Gusmao. Moxham wrote: “Many saw
it [the legislation] as a direct response to IRI activities. Fretilin even threatened
to deport IRI staff under the law after IRI sponsored an opinion poll that Fretilin
felt was deliberately worded to undermine them. An interview with IRI for this
article yielded nothing but ‘off the record’ comments, but it’s
safe to say that they view Fretilin through the paranoid haze of Cold War goggles.”
Eruption of neo-colonialism
The activities of Washington and its Australian ally in East Timor were part
of the inter-imperialist rivalries that erupted in the 1990s following the collapse
of the Soviet Union. By 2002, the struggle for supremacy in Dili was taking
place as the Bush administration was ratcheting up its broader international
offensive under the banner of the “global war on terrorism”. Not
surprisingly, in the lead up to the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the
political factions in East Timor lined up with their international backers.
Fretilin echoed the positions of France and Germany, which were publicly insisting
that the UN weapons inspectors be given more time, while in February 2003, Horta
penned a scurrilous piece in the New York Times arguing that the imminent war
would bring peace and democracy to the Iraqi people.
The Howard government joined the illegal invasion of Iraq to secure Australian
interests in the Middle East and to win Washington’s backing for its ambitions
in the Asian Pacific region. In July 2003, just four months after the “coalition
of the willing” invaded Iraq, Canberra followed suit with its own “pre-emptive”
military intervention. Howard seized on the social and political crisis in the
Solomon Islands to declare it a “failed state” and bullied the government
into permitting the landing of more than 2,000 troops and police—predominately
Australian—and allowing Australian officials to take over the main levers
of state power for the next decade. At the same time, Australia used the Solomons
intervention to threaten and intimidate other small Pacific Island states, insisting
on norms of “good governance” and inserting Australian bureaucrats
into top positions in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Nauru.
In East Timor, however, unlike the other Pacific countries, the Howard government
faced determined opposition. It responded by waging a barely-disguised subterranean
political war, in alliance with Washington, and through its political proxies
in the anti-government opposition, against Alkatiri and his Fretilin backers.
Hostility to Fretilin intensified after Alkatiri refused to accept loans from
the World Bank and Asian Development Bank and turned, instead, to China, Cuba
and Brazil for investment, financial aid and other forms of assistance.
While its Australian opponents continually refer to Fretilin as “Marxist”,
none of the measures it has implemented has anything to do with Marxism or socialism.
An unnamed diplomat recently described the Dili government as “the best
bunch of neo-liberals” that could be wished for. The real target of US
and Australian hostility has been Fretilin’s relations with their strategic
and economic rivals, with Washington particularly concerned about the growth
of China’s influence.
In September 2003, a “Dateline” program entitled “Timor’s
President Under Siege”, aired on Australian SBS television, again highlighted
the growing animosity towards Alkatiri. Joao Saldanha, head of the US-oriented
East Timor Study Group, complained: “We are trying to isolate East Timor
from the rest of the world. We are a small country. I don’t think we can
afford to do that ... There is a shift in this government. There’s some
attention, not much going to Australia, to the US, to Japan, but I think it
is going to China.” Foreign Minister Horta criticised Alkatiri for rejecting
World Bank loans, saying: “I would move faster to enter into these matters
which are a potential for investors, privileges, so that they beginning [sic]
investing, you know.”
Fretilin’s opponents offered the false panacea of market reforms. It
gathered together under the anti-Fretilin umbrella former Falintil fighters,
disgruntled at the government’s failure to provide due recognition for
their past services, unemployed youth with no prospect of a job or a future,
officials formerly employed under the Indonesian junta and villagers lacking
even the most basic health and education services. Alkatiri’s “Muslim”
background and Fretilin’s insistence on making Portuguese the national
language, provided further grist for the opposition’s mill. In his end-of-year
address in December 2003, Gusmao once again openly criticised the Fretilin government.
This time, he made a bid for additional powers, calling for the establishment
of two presidential consultative bodies, the Council of State and the Superior
Council for Defence and Security.
Part Three
In an article entitled “East Timor: Alkatiri speaks” published
last month on the New Matilda website, well-known Australian freelance journalist
John Martinkus investigated Prime Minister Alkatiri’s claims that his
political opponents had sought to gain control of the country’s army and
foment a coup against the government.
Speaking to Martinkus, the prime minister said: “They were always trying
to get command of Falintil-FDTL [East Timor’s Defence Forces]. They tried
to convince the command to order and participate in a coup. They failed. When
they failed to bring the command to join their forces in a coup then what they
did is they tried to break F-FDTL and they did it by bringing out of their barracks
almost 600 which they called the petitioners.”
The strike and protests carried out by 600 soldiers over pay and conditions
in February and March; their subsequent sacking by the Alkatiri government;
and the suppression of violent protests involving soldiers, young gangs and
opposition politicians on April 28, were repeatedly cited in the Australian
media as the reasons for sending in Australian troops.
Having spoken to the East Timorese military about these events, Martinkus wrote:
“Senior sources within the command of F-FDTL confirmed that Alkatiri’s
claims were genuine. They say three separate approaches had been made to the
leadership to launch a coup against Alkatiri in the past 18 months.
“I was able to confirm that in April 2005, following weeks of mass demonstrations
against Alkatiri’s Government, the commander of the F-FDTL, Brigadier
Taur Matan Ruak, had been approached to lead a coup by senior figures within
East Timor’s Catholic church. He rejected the offer. He was approached
again early this year and asked to lead a coup in a meeting with two prominent
East Timorese leaders and two foreign nationals. Again he refused, reportedly
telling them it was against the Constitution and would set an unacceptable precedent.
“One of his leading deputies, Lieutenant-Colonel Falur Rate Laek, a veteran
of the war against Indonesia, was also approached by the same two local leaders
and foreign nationals. He also refused.
“Due to the sensitivity of the information, the nationalities of the
foreigners were not revealed.”
The military officers involved, as well as Alkatiri and the Fretilin leaders,
clearly know who made these approaches, including the names and nationalities
of the foreigners concerned. Their failure to name names was not surprising.
It flowed directly from Fretilin’s continuing refusal to openly oppose
the Australian-led invasion of the country. Fearing it could lose control of
a mass movement against the military occupation, Alkatiri bowed to pressure
and agreed to “invite” the Australian troops. He then resigned his
post as prime minister and, not long after, gave his blessing to the installation
of Horta.
The church’s hostility to Fretilin
It is not difficult to fathom who was behind the moves against the Fretilin
government. Since 2001, the political opposition drew sustenance from the US
and Australia, with Washington according the leading role to Canberra. If the
“foreigners” were not Australian or US officials or agents, they
were certainly acting in the knowledge that the ousting of the Alkatiri government
would be welcomed by Howard and Bush.
The claims made to Martinkus are certainly credible. The hostility of the Catholic
church to the Fretilin government emerged in the debates over the new country’s
constitution, when church officials and opposition politicians argued for the
reestablishment of Catholicism as the state religion. While their bid was unsuccessful,
Bishop Belo nevertheless forced the removal of a clause expressing the basic
democratic tenet of “separation of church and state” and another
referring to the right to divorce.
In April 2005, church leaders organised a protracted campaign lasting several
weeks to oppose the Fretilin government’s decision to make religious education
in schools optional rather than compulsory. This elementary democratic step
provoked bitter denunciation from the church, which demanded the ousting of
Alkatiri. Speaking at a Dili rally on April 19, 2005, Father Benancio Araujo
denounced the “dictatorship of Alkatiri” and warned that the church
would summon people from beyond the capital to “topple the anti-democratic
regime”. According to a report in Asia Times, the US ambassador to East
Timor openly supported the church’s protests, even attending one of the
demonstrations in person.
In late April, Alkatiri accused the church of acting like an “opposition
party”, then backed down and withdrew his plans to make religious education
voluntary. The retreat only emboldened the Catholic priests. In January 2006,
a leading Fretilin parliamentarian, Francisco Branco, denounced a prominent
priest for waging a campaign to bring down the government. According to Branco,
the priest had told churchgoers that a decision to send students to study in
Cuba would turn East Timor into a communist country. Moreover, Fretilin had
a plan to kill nuns and priests if it won the next election.
Rival contracts
There were at least two other reasons why the anger of Australia and the US
with the Fretilin government deepened at the start of 2006. In January, Canberra
and Dili finally signed a deal over the joint exploitation of the oil and gas
fields in the Timor Sea. While the lion’s share still went to Australia,
Alkatiri had forced the Howard government to make limited, but significant,
concessions to East Timor. Moreover, Dili was also examining proposals to cooperate
with China and several European countries, rather than Australia, to explore
and develop other potential energy resources in East Timorese territory.
In February, the Dili government called tenders for its own Timor Trough fields,
after a Chinese-Norwegian survey estimated that the area held half a billion
barrels of light oil, and some 10 trillion cubic feet of gas (about 10 percent
of the total estimated Timor Sea reserves). By the April 19 deadline, five companies
had submitted bids, either individually or in consortia. They were Italy’s
ENI, Portugal’s GALP (in which ENI is the majority shareholder), Brazil’s
Petroleo Brasileiro (Petrobas), Malaysia’s Petronas and India’s
Reliance.
At the same time, the East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
(CAVR) released a comprehensive report about the crimes of the Indonesian dictatorship
in East Timor between 1975 and 1999 and the responsibility of the major powers,
especially the US and Australia, for their complicity. The report, which was
funded by the UN, cut directly across efforts by Gusmao to bury the past and
to effect reconciliation with Indonesia. In formally presenting it to the UN
Security Council, Gusmao opposed the document and attempted to suppress its
findings.
The report was eventually leaked to the media. The US and Australia both reacted
angrily to its conclusions, which, while limited, nevertheless held the two
countries responsible for supporting the Indonesian junta and called on them
to pay reparations to East Timor. As far as Canberra and Washington were concerned,
the CAVR report constituted, not only yet another black mark against the Alkatiri
government, but also against the UN. Their hostility to the UN stemmed from
the fact that, in attempting to carry out its mandate, the organisation had
helped install and maintain the Alkatiri government. The Bush administration
had repeatedly opposed the extension of the UN presence in East Timor and, in
mid-2005, succeeded in having the size and aims of the mission wound back considerably.
In January 2006 and again in May, in the midst of the political crisis, the
US and Australia both opposed any further UN presence in East Timor.
The military option
Given its long record of intrigue, there is no doubt that Australia had a direct
hand in the political events leading up to its May 24 military intervention.
The Howard government’s close relations with Gusmao and Ramos-Horta were
undoubtedly augmented by a network of contacts established by Australian diplomatic
staff, military personnel and intelligence operatives in Dili with opposition
politicians, rebel soldiers and police, and even gang leaders. Canberra not
only knew who was involved in the army protests in March, but, in all likelihood,
encouraged them.
During questioning before a Senate committee, Defence Deputy Secretary Strategy,
Michael Pezzullo, admitted that 28 Australian military personnel had been in
East Timor well before May 24 and had daily contact with Timorese officers.
The Greens, who fully supported the dispatch of Australian troops, asked what
these Australian officers had been doing. “I want to know if Defence had
any role in the sacking of troops that precipitated the current crisis. I want
to know what communication and cooperation Defence has had with the rebel leader
Major Reinado,” Greens Senator Kerry Nettle asked. No further details
were forthcoming.
East Timor’s opposition leaders stridently demanded a UN investigation
into the violent protest that took place on April 28 in Dili, which ended in
police killing several demonstrators. However, commenting in her article “Imperialist
Coup in East Timor”, journalist Maryann Keady wrote: “I arrived
in Dili just as the first riots broke out on April 28 this year and as an eyewitness
at the front of the unrest, the very young soldiers seem to have outside help—believed
to be local politicians and ‘outsiders’. Most onlookers cited the
ability of the dissident soldiers to go from an unarmed vocal group, to hundreds
brandishing sticks and weapons, as raising locals’ suspicion that this
was not an ‘organic’ protest. I interview many people—from
Fretilin insiders, to opposition politicians and local journalists—and
not one ruled out the fact that the riots had been hijacked for ‘other’
purposes.”
Even Horta had to acknowledge in his report to the UN Security Council on May
5 that Osorio Lequi, the leader of a newly formed opposition party, the PDRT,
had been involved in heightening tensions. Horta reported that the clashes on
April 28 were not carried out by dissident soldiers, but by a mob of youth and
some political elements, including PDRT members, who attacked the police and
went on a rampage. Significantly, at the same UN session, US and Australian
officials vehemently opposed any further extension, let alone an expansion,
of the UN mission, which was due to end. A compromise was finally struck extending
its remit for a month.
There is every reason to believe that the Howard government, with the backing
of the Bush administration, had already set in motion plans for a military occupation
of East Timor. On May 12, as he was about to leave for Washington, Howard confirmed
that the Australian military had ordered three warships to sail to waters off
the coast of East Timor, without informing the Alkatiri government. Canberra’s
gunboat diplomacy was aimed at intensifying pressure on the Fretilin leadership.
Howard was well aware that plans were underway to oust Alkatiri at a Fretilin
congress being held from May 17 to 19. The dissident faction, led by East Timor’s
ambassador to the UN and the US, Jose Luis Guterres, and the former ambassador
to Australia, Jorge Teme, was receiving open backing in the Australian media.
But Guterres’ move collapsed when the overwhelming majority of Fretilin
delegates re-endorsed Alkatiri on May 19. As soon as the congress ended, clashes
rapidly erupted between pro-government security forces and dissident soldiers,
police and youth gangs in and near Dili, providing the necessary pretext—the
collapse of “law and order”—for the Australian military to
be sent in. Two of those involved in the clashes—“Major” Alfredo
Reinado and Vincente “Railos” da Conceicao—have all the characteristics
of agents provocateur.
Reinado spent his exile in Australia and trained last year at the Australian
defence academy in Canberra. Controlling a handful of military police, he moved
on May 23, with SBS reporter David O’Shea in tow, to the outskirts of
Dili where he provoked a firefight with government troops. Feted in the Australian
media in subsequent days, Reinado made no secret of his desire for Australian
“peacekeepers” to take control, and of his insistence that Alkatiri
resign and be put on trial.
On May 24, under pressure from Gusmao and Horta, Alkatiri finally agreed to
endorse a formal invitation for troops and police from Australia, Portugal,
Malaysia and New Zealand to enter the country. Within hours, the first Australian
soldiers began to land at Dili airport. But the clashes in Dili continued as
Australia pressed for final agreement on the extent of its involvement and the
rules of engagement. In his interview with journalist Martinkus, Alkatiri explained
that Reinado and Railos joined forces that day for a joint attack on a pro-government
military base at Tacitolu. Interestingly, Railos was to emerge just a fortnight
later with allegations that he was the leader of a pro-Fretilin “hit squad,”
armed by interior minister Lobato with Alkatiri’s agreement! This completely
unsubstantiated claim quickly became the pretext for demands that both leaders
resign.
Howard cut short his visit to Ireland to arrive back in Australia on May 24,
in time to publicly announce the dispatch of troops to East Timor. As news came
in of the escalating clashes at Tacitolu and elsewhere, Howard gave the order
for the intervention to proceed “full steam ahead” without waiting
for final agreement from the Alkatiri government. Within days, the full force
of 1,300 Australian troops and police, backed by armoured vehicles and attack
helicopters was on the ground. At the insistence of Australian diplomats and
military officials, the Fretilin government conceded wide powers to these “peace-keepers,”
allowing them to effectively impose martial law in Dili.
The chronology of events over the past five years demonstrates that the Australian
military occupation of East Timor, the subsequent removal of Alkatiri and the
installation of Ramos-Horta as prime minister, were not the outcome of the unforeseen
breakdown of “law and order” in Dili. They were, on the contrary,
the product of long-hatched plans for “regime change”, aimed at
protecting the vital economic and strategic interests of Australian imperialism.
Having failed since 2002 to secure its objective of ousting the Alkatiri government
through more indirect means, the Howard government, with the support of the
Bush administration, opted in May-June 2006 for the more direct military approach.
____________________
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